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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUSAN C. DANA, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
BRUCE E. DANA, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 880382-CA 
Trial Court No. 20582 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce from which this 
appeal is taken was signed by the Court on May 16, 1988. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 10, 1988. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this 
matter by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 1 et seq., Section 78-2A-1, et seq. Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), and Rule 3 R.Utah Ct.App. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce signed and entered by Judge John F. Wahlquist of the 
First Judicial District Court of Cache County, State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
not ruling a non-custodial parent not only has the right to 
visit his children but also an obligation. The Court should 
find that if a non-custodial parent is not willing to meet 
his visitation obligations, he should pay additional child 
support to compensate the custodial parent who must satisfy 
the needs of the children that are normally met by a non-
custodial parent who visits regularly. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
finding a significant change of circumstances without 
defining such changes and where the facts show that no 
material change in circumstances from that considered at the 
original trial has occurred. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when 
it arbitrarily used a child support schedule when no such 
schedule was in existence when the original decree was 
entered to reduce child support without considering the 
other factors used by the court when the original decree was 
made. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when 
it considered all eight children including one adopted and 
another conceived by Respondent after the divorce decree was 
entered, to reduce the child support for the three children 
at issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a child support/visitation case. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The parties were divorced on January 13, 1983. 
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A Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree was filed on 
November 6, 1986 and a trial was held on December 29, 1987 
before Judge John F. Wahlquist of the First Judicial 
District. 
The Order Modifying the Divorce Decree was signed by 
the Court on May 16, 1988 and was entered May 19, 1988. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were also signed by 
Judge Wahlquist on May 16, 1988 and entered May 19, 1988. 
Susan Dana filed the Notice of Appeal on June 10, 1988. 
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
After a trial, the court entered an Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce. In making the order, the trial court 
stated there had been a substantial change in circumstances 
since the Divorce Decree was entered on January 13, 1983. 
The court found Appellant's current income as being in 
excess of $17,000 per year and the Respondent's regular 
monthly income at $2,575 per month plus $306 per month from 
Social Security. The Court considered the three children 
born to Respondent and his first wife who died, three 
children conceived in the marriage to Appellant, and two 
children from his current marriage with his third wife, one 
adopted who was his third wife's child at the time of their 
marriage and one born after, and set the support at $100 per 
month per child for the three children residing with 
Appellant based on a support level for eight children using 
the Uniform Child Support schedules now in force, thus 
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reducing the support from $165 per month per child set in 
the original decree. The Appellant was allowed to claim the 
three children as dependents for income taxes in the future. 
The court also suggested that Respondent's visitation 
be every other weekend as well as a certain time during 
Christmas, noting he could not require Respondeat to visit. 
The court's order includes a 3-day notification provision in 
case a visitation period must be missed, and the month of 
July for summer visitation. 
The court also ordered that each party assume their own 
attorney fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellant and Respondent were divorced on January 
13, 1983 after a contested hearing before Judge Omer J. 
Call. At the time of the divorce, Respondent had three 
children from a previous marriage and Appellant and 
Respondent had another three children during their marriage. 
(Transcript, page 3, lines 22-25; page 4, lines 1-3, 18-25; 
page 5, lines 1-5.) 
2. Appellant testified that previous to her marriage 
she was employed with the civil service with a GS rating of 
5. Upon marriage she quit her job, withdrew her retirement 
and used the money with this marriage, and did not work 
outside the home for the eight years between marriage and 
divorce. (Transcript, page 3, lines 14-16; page 15, lines 
5-25.) 
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3. At the time of the divorce there was no visitation 
schedule set up and support was set by the court at $165 per 
month per child based on the difficult financial 
circumstances Respondent was in at the time. (Transcript, 
page 5, lines 13-20; page 20, lines 16-19; page 21, lines 
12-14; page 73, lines 8-24.) 
4. The desire of the parties was to be able to work 
out visitation without court involvement. However, 
scheduling of visitation by Respondent became irregular and 
less frequent than had originally been hoped and several 
attempts by Appellant to remedy the situation proved 
fruitless. (Transcript, page 9; page 22, lines 22-25; page 
23, lines 1-20.) 
5. As a result of the difficulties in scheduling of 
visitation and the desire for her daughters to have a 
relationship with their father and their three half-sisters 
who remained with Respondent, Appellant filed for a 
modification of the Divorce Decree requiring visitation with 
the children to be more regular and often or to have the 
child support increased to make up for the benefits lost to 
the children because of this lack of regular visitation with 
their father and other family. (Transcript, page 12, lines 
20-25; page 13, lines 1-11; page 23, lines 11-20.) 
6. In response to the Petition for Modification, 
Respondent filed a counter-petition asking that the child 
support be reduced because of an alleged change in 
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circumstances. (Transcript, page 69, lines 19-21; page 71, 
lines 9-17; page 74, lines 8-12.) 
7. After Appellant's petition was filed, Respondent 
increased the regularity and amount of time visiting with 
the three girls without any reduction in the court awarded 
child support amount. (Transcript, page 12, lines 8-19; 
page 44, lines 17-25.) 
8. Respondent defended his less frequent visitation 
because of finances and the expense of travel to pick up and 
return the children. Between the divorce date and the 
filing of the modification petition, both parties relocated, 
resulting in less distance between them. This decrease, 
however, did not substantially alter Respondent's lack of 
visitation until after the petition was filed. (Transcript, 
page 60, lines 9-15; page 61, lines 13-16; pages 62, lines 7-
11; page 81, lines 14-24.) 
9. Appellant testified that after the divorce she once 
again sought employment as she testified at thes original 
divorce trial she would do. She was able to find work once 
again with Civil Service but at a status far below what it 
would have been had she been able to secure the same type of 
civil service position she held at the time of her 
marriage. Her current earnings are about 50 percent of what 
they would have been had she been able to begin where she 
left off. She is now making about $17,000 a year. 
Respondent acknowledged that the parties contemplated at 
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the time of the original Divorce Decree that Appellant would 
soon become employed. The parties expected she would earn 
$10,000 to $12,000 per year as a beginning salary after the 
divorce. (Transcript, pages 17-20; page 27, lines 5-7; page 
28, lines 2-4.) 
10. The Respondent testified that during the same time 
period he had changed employers several times but still held 
the same type of job and that his income had gone from 
$21,000 to $32,000. (Transcript, page 49, lines 7-8; page 
73, lines 4-15; page 76, lines 16-21.) He has remarried, 
adopting the child of his third wife and then having one of 
their own as well. (Transcript, page 74, lines 12-17; page 
75, lines 2-8.) 
11. Respondent testified that his new family situation 
made his financial situation difficult and the support 
payments next to impossible at their then present levels. 
However, Respondent further testified that his financial 
situation was in the same stress before the original Divorce 
Decree as it was at the time of having showed that even 
though he is currently making more money the circumstances 
have not really changed. (Transcript, page 59, lines 19-
22; page 65, line 1; page 69, lines 19-21; page 73, lines 8-
23. ) 
12. Respondent further stated that he knew his support 
obligations before remarrying as did his third wife. He 
took on the eventual responsibility of two more children 
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knowing his financial situation* His third wife, who was 
working at the time of their marriage at a salary of 
$8,000, quit soon after the marriage, knowing of the support 
obligations, and yet became totally dependent on 
Respondent. (Transcript, page 74, lines 18-25; page 75, 
lines 1-11; page 75, lines 23-25; page 76, lines 1-7.) 
13. There is dispute between the parties regarding 
visitation. Respondent claimed he had attempted more visits 
than acknowledged by the Appellant and he did not visit more 
because of the hostility created by the Plaintiff and the 
children towards him. (Transcript, pages 65-66; page 62, 
lines 12-13; page 62, lines 23-25; page 71, lines 18-24.) 
14. Respondent did admit at the hearing that he felt 
the children needed to spend more time with him and that his 
right to visitation carries with it an obligation to visit 
the children. (Transcript, page 82, lines 4-11; page 82, 
lines 13-16. ) 
15. After a half day trial, Judge Wahlquist entered an 
order from the bench wherein he encouraged visitation but 
did not order specific visitation (Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce, numbered paragraphs 4 and 5; Transcript, page 96, 
lines 10-21) and he mentioned there was a change in 
circumstances but did not specify what it was (Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, numbered paragraph 1). He 
entered a new order basing child support on the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule (Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, 
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numbered paragraph 10; Transcript, page 95, lines 7-17) and 
allowing all eight children to be counted as part of the 
application of that schedule (Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce, numbered paragraph 3; Transcript, page 95, lines 
17-22). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The court's failure to find that Respondent had not 
only a right but an obligation to visit his children was an 
abuse of discretion. The irregular and unpredictable 
visitation schedule that Respondent maintained left 
Appellant with an obligation to fill the needs normally met 
by a non-custodial parent who visits. The fulfillment of 
these needs by the Appellant should be paid through 
additional child support. 
2. The trial court found a change in circumstances 
but did not give the parties any reference as to what 
those changes were. This constitutes an abuse of discretion 
especially given the fact that no material change in 
earnings has occurred from the time of the original trial. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion when it 
arbitrarily used a child support schedule when one was not 
used when the original Divorce Decree was made, especially 
given the fact that the court did not consider other factors 
which were vital to that decree when it was originally made. 
One example is the court's failure to consider the award of 
retirement benefits to Respondent, while Appellant had 
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cashed in her retirement benefits at the time of their 
marriage to assist the new family, 
4. The consideration of two more children,, one 
adopted, after the original Divorce Decree was entered, was 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN TO HAVE REGULAR 
VISITATION WITH THEIR NON-CUSTODIAL 
PARENT IS AN OBLIGATION THAT, IF NOT 
MET, SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR BY OTHER 
MEANS. 
The importance of the rights of the child in visitation 
and child support has always been a prime concern. This is 
based on the principle that regardless of the sentiments of 
the adults involved, it is the child who as an innocent 
victim deserves protection. This sentiment is expressed 
and followed in jurisdictions throughout the country. In 
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980), the court said 
that in the determination of visitation rights, the court 
must give the highest priority to the welfare of the 
children over the desires of either parent. 
In protecting the best interests of a child, the court 
can allow or order visitation. "Although the awarding of 
visitation and child support is within the court's 
discretion, the court must consider the childfs permanent 
right to and need for his parent's support." Pace v. Pace, 
740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987); Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-
-10-
45-3, 78-45-4; Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1985). 
Such concerns are evident in this case and arise 
because of the irregularity and infrequency of the 
visitation of a father with his children and the additional 
factor of three other half-sisters living with the father 
whom the children, now with the mother, have known and loved 
while living together. Not only does the relationship 
between the parent and child suffer, but the relationship 
between siblings suffers as children become perplexed at the 
reasons why they are unable to regularly see sisters whom 
they love. 
Additional money would allow the custodial parent to do 
special things with the children that normally occur while 
visiting with the non-custodial parent. The custodial 
parent must hire babysitters, stay with the children or 
lose some free time if children have not gone with the non-
custodial parent. Money is a poor substitute for a father's 
time but it is the only substitute. 
Despite this evidence, the trial court was unwilling to 
order specific visitation even though Respondent admitted an 
obligation to visit his children. 
It is the responsibility of the court to guard the 
welfare of the children and should set a determinate 
schedule of visitation to which Respondent is obligated or 
compensate those children for a lack of visitation with an 
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increase of child support so the custodial parent can try 
to meet their unfulfilled needs. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FINDING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED 
WITHOUT DEFINING SUCH CHANGES, AND 
ARBITRARILY DECREASING A PREVIOUS CHILD 
SUPPORT ORDER USING SOLELY A CHILD 
SUPPORT SCHEDULE WHICH WAS NOT IN USE AT 
THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that to obtain a 
modification of the divorce decree, the party seeking 
modification has the burden to show a substantial change of 
circumstances. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 
(Utah 1985); Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983); 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978). 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1981), the trial court granted a modification of a decree 
which was reversed on appeal because there was no showing of 
substantial change in circumstances sufficient to support a 
modification of a decree. The court held that when a 
modification is denied, there need be no further discussion. 
However, when modification is granted, the court "should 
make findings to indicate why modification was found to be 
appropriate." 628 P.2d at 1301. The court also said such 
information "materially assists the parties in determining 
whether there may be basis for an appeal and if an appeal is 
taken, significantly assists this court in its review." Id. 
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The court clearly abused its discretion in failing to 
perform its incumbent duty to specifcally inform the parties 
what the material and substantial change in circumstances 
was. The record further shows that there was no significant 
and material change in circumstances in this case and even 
if there were changes, they did not support a reduction in 
child support. 
Appellant was working at the time of the marriage to 
Respondent and upon divorce it was anticipated that she 
could find a job in which she would be earning $10,000 to 
$12,000 per year. (Original Divorce Decree, numbered 
paragraph 10; Transcript, page 78, lines 6-11.) When 
Appellant did get work it was at about that level. After 
four years it has gone to about $17,000 or about a 45% 
increase. 
Respondent was earning $21,000 at the time of divorce, 
which had increased to $32,000 at the time of modification, 
a difference of $11,000 or about a 50% increase, which is 
still about twice as much money as that earned by Appellant. 
These differences are proportionate and do not 
demonstrate a substantial or material change in the 
circumstance of either party. The trial court cannot 
solely consider the fact that the custodial spouse has 
obtained employment and is earning a modest income when 
considering the obligor spouse's petition for reduction in 
child support where it is evident that the mother might 
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have to go to work to support herself. Hoibrook v. 
Holbrook, 208 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1949). Naturally the mother 
would have to support herself and that it would seem strange 
to permit the husband and father to force her into such a 
situation without showing some change for the worse in his 
ability to meet his obligations. Id. at 1115. 
While Respondent did testify to an increase in 
financial obligation since the time of the divorce, he is 
also making $11,000 more per year and testified as well that 
he was feeling the same kind of financial stress before the 
original Divorce Decree and Support Order as he was at the 
time of the hearing. In essence financial circumstances 
have not changed. (Transcript, page 73, lines 8-23.) 
Given that there is no material change in circumstances 
and "a child's right to support is paramount," the court 
abused its discretion in lowering the child support using 
solely a schedule when no such schedule was in use at the 
time of the original order. 
Ill 
THAT IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER TWO 
AFTERBORN CHILDREN TO DECREASE A CHILD 
SUPPORT ORDER. 
After Appellant and Respondents divorce, Respondent 
married for a third time. This new wife had a child from a 
previous relationship which Respondent adopted. They also 
had a child from their marriage. 
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At the time of the modification the trial judge 
considered eight children, rather than the six present at 
the time of the original decree, in reducing the child 
support. This was done without reference to the third 
wife's knowledge of the situation and her responsibility to 
help provide for her children in such a situation. 
The Utah Supreme Court said in Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), that while the present spouse of a 
divorced party should not be constrained to lend financial 
support to his or her spouse's children by a prior marriage, 
the court may consider the income of the present spouse in 
determining the ability to pay of the one who has the legal 
obligation of child support. 
In this case Respondent's third wife, knowing of 
Respondent's six other children, quit her $8,000 a year job, 
leaving her and her children's financial welfare solely 
dependent on Respondent. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1981), the court considered a modification of a decree where 
the obligor father had six children by his first marriage 
and an additional two by his second. The court said that 
there was no evidence to warrant a modification based on 
those facts and that "it cannot be presumed that defendant's 
support obligation toward his six children by his prior 
marriage is changed by the fact he now has two additional 
children." Id. at 1300. 
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Such a presumption should not be enforced in this case 
either. The obligation of Respondent to his new children is 
recognized but that does not make any less important his 
obligation to the six children he already had. He knew of 
his obligations before his remarriage. His earlier 
children should not be the ones who pay for his informed and 
knowledgeable choice. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court and rule that Respondent has an obligation, not just a 
right, to visit his children and if that obligation is not 
met, then Respondent should pay an increased child support. 
This Court should rule it an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to fail to list the changes in circumstances 
it held existed, but this Court should also recognize there 
are no material changes in circumstances in this case. It 
is also an abuse of discretion to use solely a child support 
schedule when it was not used at the time of the original 
decree. 
Finally, Appellant requests that this Court held it an 
abuse of discretion to consider eight rather than six 
children in this support order and return support to its 
previous level effective from the date of the trial court 
order. She further requests that she be awarded her 
reasonable attorney fees and costs of this appeal. 
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Dated this /i day of October, 1988. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
r/ 
iYZEjW. HILLYARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postpaid, to 
Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent, at 2447 
Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this day of October, 
1988. 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAKOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
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Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN C. DANA, 
Plaintiff , 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
u -
D O 
Z 3 
U c6 > 
< Z 
H 
IS 
BRUCE E. DANA, 
Defendant. 
CIVIL cJO: 205 c 2 
This matter having ccme on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, on the 29th day of Decem-
ber, 1987, on the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce 
Decree as to visitation and the claiming of the three (3) 
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer 
and Counter-Petition to reduce child support, and each cf 
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received; argument 
have been made to the Court, and the Court being fully 
cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters the 
following: 
y':::i>\:<c,s av y,\cr AND 
C:O;.V.,I;SIL':::; cv L A W 
A - 1 
Civil No: 2058. 
D
 2 
z 3 
LU c6 
< X 
GO ^ 
IN. Q 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on 
January 13, 1983, and at the time of the divorce there was 
hatred between the parties and there is still hatred. 
2. That at the time of the divorce, there was an 
emergency need for the Court to grant to the Plaintiff her 
child support and the Uniform Child Support Schedule provid-
ed that the Plaintiff v/hen he earned approximately S3,COO. 00 
in the year 1983, but that the emergency has ceased in that 
the Plaintiff is employed by the United States government 
and'has an annual income in excess of 517,000.00. 
3. That the Court finds that neither party acted in 
good faith in that the Plaintiff is continuing her hatred of 
the' Defendant and wants to be boss, and feels guilt on her 
part plus frustration in thr*t the three (3) minor children 
born as issue of the marriage do not have a father. 
4. That the Defendant's motive in having the trial is 
that he cannot communicate v/ith his former wife and in order 
to reach the children he has to go through the Plaintiff for 
communications, which he cannot do. 
5. That the Court finds that this divorce should be 
treated as an ordinary divorce; that the parties should 
pursue the culture of di.vorced people in a divorced world. 
Civil No: 20 5 8 
6. That there has been a substantial change o. 
circumstance since the Decree in that the Plaintiff's incom 
has gone from $3,000.00 per year to $17,000.00 per year, aiv 
that the Defendant's income has gone from $21,000.00 pe-
year to $31,380.91 per year, or $2,575.00 per month, buc 
that the emergency situation has terminated. 
7. That the Defendant is now obligated to suppor'-. 
eight (8) children and since the divorce has remarried; ha" 
one natural child born as issue of that marriage, plus ha.--: 
adopted a child for a total of eight (8). 
8. That the Plaintiff receives $306.00 as and f c 
social security for the three (3) children the Defendant i-
the father of, born prior to his marriage to this Plaintiff. 
9. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff cannc 
force the Defendant to visit if he doesn't want to. 
10. That the Defendant's present income for purpose 
of child support, v/hich shall be established in accordanc 
with the Uniform Support Schedule shall be based on th 
Defendant's monthly income of $2,575.00 plus the $306.00 h 
receives from social security for a total gross income o 
$2,881.00, and under the Uniform Child Support Schedule fc 
eight (8) children, it is $94.00 per month. 
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11. That the Uniform Support Schedule is generally set 
for the custodial parent to claim the children as dependents 
for tax purposes. 
12. That under the original Decree of Divorce, the 
Plaintiff was entitled to claim one (1) child and the 
Defendant two (2) children born as issue of this marriage, 
and that Plaintiff has claimed all three (3) children for 
1985 and 1986, and the Defendant has claimed two (2) chil-
dren per the Decree of Divorce. 
13. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there has been a substantial change of 
circumstance since the Decree was entered, and that the 
Defendant shall be obligated to pay child support based on 
eight (8) children and his gross monthly income of $2,575.00 
plus $306.00 social security he receives for his three (3) 
older daughters as a result of his first wife's demise. 
2. That commencing with the month of January, 1988, 
the child support sh.all be based on $2,881.00 for eight (8) 
children, or $94.00 per month per child, for a total of 
$282.00. 
FINDINGS OF FACT ANi) 
CONCLUSIONS OK LAW 
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3. That there has been a substantial change in that 
the Plaintiff's income has increased from $3,000.00 annual 
income in 1983 to in excess of $17,000.00 per year in 1987. 
4. That the Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the 
three (3) children as dependents for income tax purposes in 
the future. 
5. That the Court makes no order as to the years 1985 
and 1986, when both parties claimed all three (3) children 
as dependents contrary to the Court Order, and leaves it up 
to Internal Revenue Service for a determination. 
6. That the Defendant's visitation with the minor 
children shall be every other Friday, commencing with the 
first Friday in January, 1938, from 6:00 p.m. Friday to 
6:00 p.m. Sunday, provided however, that if the Defendant is 
not going to visit the minor children he must notify them 
three (3) days in advance that he is not coming to pick up 
the children. 
7. The Defendant is entitled to have the children 
Christmas Day at 2:00 p.m. and keep the children for four 
(4) additional days. 
8. That the Defendant shall have the entire month of 
July for summer visitation, but there will be no reduction 
in child support during the month of July. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND A - 5 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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9. That Plaintiff may have Mother's Day, regardless 
of show weekend, and Defendant to have Father's Day, regard-
less of whose weekend. 
10. That if the Uniform Child Support Schedule changes 
in July, 1988, then the child support v/ill be changed to the 
July, 1988, Schedule without further hearing in this matter. 
11. That this hearing was necessitated because of 
Plaintiff's hatred towards the Defendant, and her desire to 
be boss, but that the Defendant has benefited from the 
hearing. 
12. That each of the parties have incurred attorney 
fees and costs and that each party should pay same. 
DATED this _ J _ _ day of ^ ar.udry, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
in 
LYLE W\ 'HILLYARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-24 64 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN C. DANA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BRUCE E. DANA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCI 
CIVIL NO: 20532 
This matter having come on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, on the 2 9th day of Decem-
ber, 1987, on the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce 
Decree as to visitation and the claiming of the three (3) 
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer 
and Counter-Petition to reduce child support, and each of 
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, argument 
have been made to the Court, and the Court being fully 
cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and the Court 
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having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;, 
separated stated in writing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. THat there has been -a substantial change of 
circumstance' since the Divorce Decree v/as entered on January 
13, 1983. 
2. That the Plaintiff's present income is in excess 
of $17,000.00 per year, and that the Defendant's income is 
$2,575.00 per month, plus he rec $306.00 from social 
security for the three (3) older daughters, not the issue of 
this marriage, from the demise of his first wife. 
3. That Defendant's child support shall be based on 
eight (8) children and a gross income of $2,881.00, or 
$100.00 per month per child as and for support. 
4. That the Defendant's visitation with the minor 
children shall be every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 
p.m. through Sunday, at 6:00 p.m., starting with the first 
Friday in 1988, and in addition, shall have the children 
Christmas Day from 2:00 p.m. and four (4) days thereafter 
each and every year thereafter. 
5. That if the Defendant is not going to exercise his 
weekend visitation, he is to notify the children three (3) 
days prior to the scheduled visitation. 
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•6. That the Defendant shall be entitled to have the 
month of July for summer visitation, but that the child 
support shall not be abated. 
7. That each of the parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs in connection with these 
proceedings .* 
8. That the Court makes no Order on the 1985 and 1936 
income tax return filings made by both parties wherein 
Plaintiff claimed all three (3) of the children in 1935 and 
1986, and Defendant claimed two (2) per the Court Order in 
1985 and 1986, and leaves that up to IRS and based on the 
original Decree of Divorce. 
9. That the Plaintiff will be entitled to claim all 
three (3) of the children in the future. 
10. That the State is anticipating a new Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to become effective in July, 1988, and if 
it becomes effective, then the child support shall be in 
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accordance with the new Schedule which becomes effective in 
July, 1988, without further hearing. 
DATED this / (y? day of May, 1988. 
]Y THE] COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J/Oace 
T 
Atxt^ -rney for Plaintiff 
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